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I INTRODUCTION
This paper applies insights from governance and multi-level governance(MLG) studies to the analysis of Social Partnership in order to: (1) outline
a methodological approach for the study of Social Partnership over time; and
(2) to provide neutral framework for analysis that will facilitate the collection
of empirical evidence that may contribute (either positively or negatively) to
the theorising of Social Partnership as a new form of governance. The
proposed methodology focuses on the extent of policy integration (and/or
disaggregation) between policy interests in the Social Partnership model in
order to ascertain how inclusive Irish Social Partnership is. This is considered
to be important, given the variety of claims made for Social Partnership as an
instrument of direct and participatory democracy.
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II COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND THE GOVERNANCE TURN
Across Europe, the process of policy change has been beset by
developments along two dimensions. The first, or vertical dimension, refers to
the shifting levels of policy authority and influence between international,
national, regional and even local levels of government or administration. The
second, or horizontal dimension, refers to the shifting competencies of policy
actors and agencies arising as a consequence of new interpretations of
government’s role in the organisation and administration of public policy. In
an attempt to locate Social Partnership within this broader context of policy
change, this paper incorporates two central concepts from the recent literature
on changing patterns of governance. The first, multi-level governance, which
has its origins in studies of European integration, addresses itself most
directly to the vertical dimension of policy change associated with the
increasing “Europeanisation” of domestic politics.1 The second, policy
networks, is primarily (though not exclusively) concerned with the horizontal
dimension of policy change associated with the replacement of conventional
direct governmental action by a more complex system of policymaking and
implementation, involving new sets of actors and relationships between them.
Ironically, the literatures on governance and MLG were separately
developed by different groups of academics working on different sets of
empirical data. As a result, Multi-level governance was concerned with studies
of European Integration and characterising the extent of integration between
alternative policy actors that emerged as a result of this process. The
governance literature was primarily concerned with studies of public policy
and state theory. The development of the governance idea in relation to public
policy studies in Britain by Rhodes and others (1994, 1996, 1997), led to its
clear association with policy disaggregation and the rise of so-called network
governance. 
Whilst the trend in EU studies has been to incorporate a range of ideas
and concepts from other areas of political science (such as comparative
politics, international relations and public policy approaches) in order to
develop more analytical approaches to characterising the precise terms of
change and the impact of EU involvement in the policymaking processes of
member state political systems (Andersen and Eliassen, 2001; Goetz and Hix,
2001; Heritier et al, 2001; Knill, 2001). The diffusion of ideas the other way –
from EU studies to state theory and domestic politics – has been much more
constrained (Adshead, 2002; Pierre and Stoker, 2000). This is unfortunate,
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since although they are both concerned with identifying and characterising
new patterns of governance from quite different perspectives, they are both
primarily concerned with assessing the levels of integration and/or
disaggregation of policy interests in state policymaking processes.
The point of this paper is to draw lessons from the application of
governance concepts elsewhere in order to develop a framework for analysis of
Social Partnership. The framework proposed will outline a means of
describing the difference between alternative national agreements that have
since become recognised as “Social Partnership” in terms of the level of
integration achieved between policy actors within the process, and provide a
means to “measure” this integration in terms that will facilitate a case by case
comparison of different partnership agreements. Only when this is achieved
can the really interesting arguments – about the changing nature of the state
since the advent of Social Partnership – begin.
III FINDING EVIDENCE FOR EXPLANATIONS OF 
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
To date, academics interested in the governance of the Irish state have
been offered a limited set of choices: basically you can characterise the Irish
state in any way that you want, so long as you include some reference to
corporatism. Still, the suggestion that Ireland could be classified as
straightforwardly corporatist (Lawlor, 1982) has been rejected (Hardiman,
1984, 1988; Regan and Wilson, 1986). Despite an acknowledgement of shifting
attitudes towards a more corporatist policy style (Hardiman, 1992), the
predominant view is that some moderated version of corporatism might be
more apt. In this respect, the debate has tended to focus on whether we have
neo-corporatism or competitive corporatism (Roche and Cradden, 2003) –
though the difference between the two seems to be largely in the content and
parameters of the topics considered under the arrangements, not in the
substantive modes of governance. It is argued, for example, that whilst
competitive corporatist arrangements are broadly similar to neo- corporatist
arrangements, in that they “… involved tripartite agreements concluded
jointly by unions, employers and governments” (Roche and Cradden, 2003, p.
73), they differ because:
During the 1990s, they began to focus on pay deals consistent with the
enhancement of national competitiveness; on competitively sustainable
levels of public expenditure, involving the reform of tax, pension and social
security systems; and on promoting measures to increase the flexibility,
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skill and sometimes the quantity of the labour supply (Roche and Cradden,
2003, p. 72).
An attempt to comment on governance structures, as opposed to the
content of arrangements, was put forward by O’Donnell and O’Reardon (2000,
p. 252, see also: 1997) when they argued that the “… Irish case might assist
the formulation of a new concept of post-corporatist concertation” which is
better able to portray arrangements emerging in several European countries.
Post corporatist concertation is characterised by “deliberation” and “problem-
solving” between a wider range of interests than the traditional confederations
of capital and labour and where “the capacity to shape and reshape parties’
preferences are seen to be prominent features of the dealings between the
social partners, interwoven into a process that also involves ‘hard-headed’
bargaining”(O’Donnell and O’Reardon, 2000, p. 250).
More generally, the problem that might readily be identified with all of
these approaches is that the evidence cited for each is mostly the same. This
is a difficulty already conceded by Roche and Cradden (2003, p. 86) when they
critique the post-corporatist concertation analysis of Social Partnership
provided by O’Donnell and O’Reardon (2000), suggesting that:
[–], the stress on dialogue and problem-solving as key attributes of social
partnership neglects the degree to which attributes such as these are long-
familiar and indeed quite banal features of negotiations under neo-
corporatism (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979) – as indeed they were under
pre-corporatist and non-corporatist arrangements of various kinds. 
Rejecting the “post-corporatist” interpretation on the grounds of lack of
evidence, Roche and Cradden (2003, pp. 85-7) argue that: “… the onus must be
on those committed to such an interpretation to report empirical evidence
consistent with their viewpoint”. Still, the central difficulty remains, that if
the evidence for corporatism, neo-corporatism, competitive corporatism and
(in some dimensions at least) for post-corporatism is all the same, how might
this be done and what – if any – additional benefit might governance concepts
brings to the collection of evidence?
IV USING THE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE TO CHARACTERISE
GOVERNANCE SHIFTS
Simply put, policy network analysis is a means by which to depict the
relations between different policy actors in a given policy area without
resorting to idiosyncratic descriptions of country – or policy-specific
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institutions and agents. Instead, network analysis allows us to map out the
“key players” in a given policy area by referring to their particular structural,
associational, or personal relations to each other. The explanatory utility of
this approach is subject to debate. For some, it provides a neat way of
representing complex policy arenas and policymaking processes into a few key
groupings that provide a ready framework for analysis. Thus a network
approach to the explanation of policymaking may, instead of providing long
descriptive passages about the case study in question, refer instead to a range
of key specified interests (governmental, bureaucratic, public, private or
voluntary and so on) and the nature of their interactions with each other
(Dowding, 1994,1995). 
For others, this approach to policy explanation is more than simple
description, since by emphasising the importance of certain sorts of
relationships in the policy arena over others (be they financial, professional,
personal, institutional and so on), they claim to have added a qualitative
distinction to their analysis (Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1981;
Wilkes and Wright, 1987; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Much of the work using
network analysis in Dutch and German academia goes still further by
suggesting that networks represent a new form of governance, one where
central government has either lost or else substantially revised its omnipotent
status in the policy process (Mayntz, 1994; Klijn, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997).
Some even treat networks as an alternative more significant model for the
ordering of interests than hierarchies or markets (Kenis and Schneider, 1991).
In order to impose order on a proliferating variety of network definitions,
Rhodes and Marsh (1992) constructed a typology based on the distinction
between policy communities and issue networks using “policy network” as a
generic term. The typology proposes a continuum, marked at each end by an
ideal-type – at one end, the policy community and at the other, the issue
network (see Table 1). The positioning of individual studies in relation to
either ideal-type is a matter for empirical research. According to the Rhodes
and Marsh typology, an ideal-type policy community has the following
characteristics: a limited number of participants with some groups consciously
excluded; frequent and high quality interaction between all members of the
community on all matters related to policy communities; consistency in values,
membership and policy outcomes which persist; consensus, with the ideology,
values and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; all members of
the policy community have resources so the links between them are exchange
relationships. As a result of this last criterion, the basic interaction in the
policy community is one involving bargaining between members with
resources. Rhodes and Marsh propose that in the ideal type policy community
there is a balance of power which is a positive-sum arrangement, even if all
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Table 1: Marsh and Rhodes Typology of Networks
Dimension Policy Community Issue Network
Membership:
No. of participants Very limited number, some groups Large.
consciously excluded.
Type of interest Economic and/or professional Encompasses range
interests dominate. of affected interests.
Integration:
Frequency of Frequent, high quality, interaction Contacts fluctuate in
interaction of all groups on all matters related frequency and
to policy issue. intensity.
Continuity Membership, values and outcomes Access fluctuates
persistent over time. significantly.
Consensus All participants share basic values A measure of
and accept the legitimacy of the agreement exists,
outcome. but conflict is ever 
present.
Resources:
Distribution of All participants have resources; Some participants 
resources within basic relationship is an exchange may have resources,
network relationship. but they are limited,
and basic
relationship is
consultative.
Distribution of Hierarchical; leaders can deliver Varied and variable
resources within members. distribution and
participating capacity to regulate
organisations members.
Power: There is a balance of power among Unequal powers,
members. Although one group may reflecting unequal
dominate, it must be a positive-sum resources and
game if community is to persist. unequal access. 
It is a zero-sum
game.
R.A.W. Rhodes (1997, p. 44).
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members do not benefit equally. They suggest that the structures of the
participating groups are hierarchical, so that leaders can guarantee compliant
members. Rhodes and Marsh’s characterisation of an ideal-type issue network
is in many instances the extreme opposite of the policy community: many
participants; fluctuating interaction and access for the various members;
limited consensus and ever-present conflict; interaction based on consultation
rather than negotiation or bargaining; and finally, an unequal power
relationship in which many participants may have few resources, limited
access to decision-making fora and scant influence over it.
The Rhodes and Marsh (1992) typology presents a useful set of organising
concepts for comparison because the network concepts described above can be
applied in different states and/or policy areas, with different policy making
institutions, organisations and actors. It not only facilitates uniform
characterisations of policy processes in different states and/or policy areas, but
also allows a range of comparisons along the five suggested dimensions of
network analysis: the number of participants and the type of interests they
represent; the relations between policy actors in terms of the frequency,
quality and continuity of their interactions; the distribution of resources
amongst them, in terms of the finances, status, access to information or
authority; and the distribution of power or policy authority between key policy
actors and institutions (Adshead, 2002). 
From the brief review above, we can see how a network approach to
analysis of Social Partnership might work. Nevertheless, critics argue that the
difficulty with networks is that once they have been used to characterise the
policy process, their explanatory utility is exhausted. Dowding (1994) argues
that they are “merely a set of metaphors” created for the study of British and
European politics (see also, Keohane and Hoffman, 1990). Networks, he
argues, can add nothing new to characterisations of the policy process because
all that they offer are models of policy processes that still resort to standard
macroeconomic or political theories in order to explain their existence:
The network protagonists have tried to answer empirical questions by
definitional dogma rather than constructing theories – which often already
exist – to explain their empirical observations. Conversely, they try to
resolve theoretical disputes by reference to evidence compatible with both
theories. Essentially the conflict between Jordan and the Rhodes-Marsh
acolytes is over the nature of the state. Both sides use their versions of
network theory to try to secure their position, but the empirical evidence
they cite is exactly the same (Dowding, 1994, p. 66).
Ironically, this is precisely the problem that has consistently beset Irish
academics attempting to interpret the Irish state since the advent of Social
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Partnership. It points to the fact that if network concepts are to be employed
successfully for policy analysis, they must be underpinned by an appropriate
explanatory theory. An appropriate theory should be constructed in such a way
that the evidence collected cannot be claimed by opposing theoretical
viewpoints and should also be one that does not resort to macro-level
explanations of the state in its construction (if this were the case, we would
run the risk of differentiating networks according to different interpretations
of the state and the heuristic utility of networks would be lost). 
V USING MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE LITERATURE TO
CHARACTERISE GOVERNANCE SHIFTS
Whilst there is little doubt that “… the continuing consolidation of the
European Union and the devolution of political power within the state entail
changes in institutional relationships that challenge our traditional
understanding of those relationships” (Peters and Pierre, 2003, p. 75); locating
the Irish system of Social Partnership within these changing patterns of
governance necessitates first a clear conceptualisation of what those changes
are in order to assess whether the Irish case fits into a general pattern, or if
the Irish system of Social Partnership is unique. It is in this respect that the
multi-level governance (MLG) concept has been offered as a means of
acknowledging the multi-layered and complex nature of the policy process,
through its emphasis on the shared, collective and interconnected roles of
different states, policy arenas and policy actors in domestic and EU policy
processes. 
MLG analysis is based on three main assumptions. First, decision-making
competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolised
by state executives. Second, collective decision-making between member
states implies some loss of control by individual state executives. And third,
political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. The MLG literature
seeks to avoid two traps: state centrism and the treatment of the EU as only
operating at the European level in the institutional arena of Brussels and
Strasbourg (Rosamund, 2000, p. 110). Thus, whilst MLG approaches do not
reject the notion that state executives and state arenas are “the most
important pieces of the European puzzle”, they nevertheless assert that states
have lost their monopoly – both over European policymaking and over the
aggregation of domestic interests (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 346). 
In its attempt to understand the role of the European Union in national
policymaking the multi-level governance idea represents the first attempt to
accommodate different levels of analysis in its account of the policymaking
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process. Although multi-level governance is conceptually very useful in this
regard, it is nevertheless methodologically limited. First, because it provides
no clearly defined expectations that can be used to evaluate integration, and
second, because it does not make clear how changes at different levels of
analysis relate to each other and why. These problems have been
acknowledged by the MLG theorists themselves: 
If … competencies have slipped away from central states both up to the
supranational level and down to the sub-national level, then, ceteris
paribus, one would expect greater interaction among actors at these levels.
But the details remain murky and apart from a generalised presumption of
increasing mobilisation across levels, they provide no systematic set of
expectations about which actors should mobilise and why (Marks, Nielsen
et al., 1996, p. 41). 
Whilst multi-level governance postulates a “set of overarching, multi-level
policy networks”, in which “political control is variable, not constant, across
policy areas” (Marks, Nielsen et al.,1996, p. 42), it fails to identify the origins
of these networks. Nor does it explain the connection between the formation of
these new policy networks and the decline of national government control over
policy. This raises a third limitation with multi-level governance. In the
absence of organising concepts that can be used for comparison between
different states, and without a set of hypotheses about change, multi-level
governance is only a statement of belief that is not susceptible to verification
or falsification.
VI TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
Thus far, the discussion has shown that both governance and multi-level
governance concepts offer insights into processes of policy change. Still,
however, both approaches are flawed. Multi-level governance presents a series
of propositions about policy change without any account of how to marshal
evidence in support of its claims. Policy networks present a typology of
organising concepts for case study analysis without any supporting theory to
explain the differences found between cases. The utility of using both
governance approaches in support of each other is an obvious conclusion: but
how may this help us to better understand the phenomenon of Social
Partnership?
According to the Marsh and Rhodes’ typology, we can begin to see that
various iterations of Social Partnership come closer to the ideal type “policy
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community” than others. Clearly, by their very nature policy communities
have, under the terms and conditions of their establishment, a greater
propensity towards higher levels of horizontal and vertical integration
between policy actors whereas issue networks by their very nature present a
non-integrated policy network. This is because the members of a policy
community can deliver their membership into agreements, guarantee their
compliance, develop a lasting consensus over policy aims and ambitions and
are generally supportive of negotiated policy outcomes. By contrast, the closer
a policy network is to the ideal type issue network, the less likely are the
chances of its supporting integration. This is because the membership of an
issue network is large and unwieldy where contacts between members
fluctuate in intensity and frequency and are usually conditioned by the need
to compete for scarce resources thus inhibiting co-operative or integrative
action amongst network members.
If we accept that it is possible to think of various partnership
arrangements as alternative forms of policy networks, we can further think of
analysing them in terms of the level of integration (or disaggregation)
achieved between interests operating in each of the partnership
arrangements. However, in order to differentiate the degree of policy
integration (or disaggregation) evident in one network study of Social
Partnership from another, or to chart changes in one network study of Social
Partnership over time, we need a set of hypotheses about change.
Neofunctionalist Propositions as Indicators of Integration in Policy 
Networks’ Studies of Social Partnership
Taking their name from earlier functionalist approaches by Mitrany
(1966), the “new” functionalists or neofunctionalists were concerned with
explaining the conditions necessary to develop European integration.
Neofunctionalism concerned itself with two main concepts: functional spillover
and political spillover. Functional spillover refers to the idea that as states
integrate one sector of their economies, technical pressures will push for the
integration of other sectors. It hinges upon the belief that because modern
industrial economies are made up of interdependent parts, it is not possible to
isolate one area from the rest. Political spillover, thought to be the more
powerful of the two, refers to political pressures pushing for further
integration. It hinges on the view that once one area of the economy is
integrated, the interest groups operating in that sector will begin to exert
pressure to pursue further integration. It assumes that once these groups
switch the focus of their activities to new integrative policy arrangements and
mechanisms, they quickly realise the benefits of integration (as well as the
remaining obstacles) in their sector, and consequently become advocates for
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further integration. At the same time, their acquiescence to the process of
integration prevents the government from retreating from the level of
integration thus far achieved. 
The suitability of neofunctionalist theory as an indicator of change in
policy networks arises for three reasons. First, although neofunctionalist
integration hypotheses may be positively or negatively proven in different
networks, they cannot be used to support alternative propositions about policy
making processes that are unrelated to the process of integration. Because of
this, the deployment of network analysis does not fall prey to the major
criticisms over its explanatory utility (Dowding, 1994). Second, the use of
neofunctionalist integration hypotheses enable us to place the study of Irish
Social Partnership in comparative context (with other states and between
different iterations of Social Partnership within the state) where the
differences noted between networks are in relation to integration instead of (or
at least in addition to) differences between state systems and/or policy
environments within which the policy networks are located. In other words,
they facilitate an evaluation of policymaking processes that does not
concentrate solely on how state policymaking processes differ, but why that
might be so in relation to integration. Third, because neofunctionalist
hypotheses may refer to changes in individual policy networks at sub-national
level, or to policy relations between sub-national and central government
levels, or to policy developments taking place between sub-national, national
and EU levels in the policy process, they are able to embrace different levels
of analysis in the study of policy influences and outcomes. Used in this way
neofunctionalist hypotheses provide a framework to examine the nature and
extent of multi-level governance (or more simply – the level of integration) in
policy networks.
The revival of neofunctionalism for studies of policy change might, on first
sight, seem destined for trouble. To date neofunctionalism is primarily
associated with studies of European integration where it has been regarded by
many as a “failed theory”. It is argued here that the alleged “failure of
neofunctionalism” arises because of the theory’s extensive misuse as a macro
level predictive theory of change throughout the 1950s to the mid-1970s.
During this time neofunctionalism dominated European Community
literature and found favour not only in academic circles but also amongst
policy practitioners seeking to deploy its insights to affect change. The
common acceptance of neofunctionalism as a means of explaining the origins
and development of the European Community led many to believe that it could
also predict the future. The attitude, prevalent amongst many Europeanists,
was summed up by Groom (1994, p. 113) who stated that “European
experience suggests a further aspect of neofunctionalism, that it is both a
FINDING EVIDENCE FOR EXPLANATIONS OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP 329
01 Adshead article  25/01/2007  09:48  Page 329
conceptual framework and a plan of action. In the former guise it purported to
describe what was happening, while in the latter role it pointed to what should
be done to further the process”. Initially convincing, the neofunctionalist
paradigm was soon to fail in this respect.
In deploying a neofunctionalist framework for analysing changes in the
composition and dynamics of policy networks, this research framework avoids
the predictive failings of the genre by adopting Lindberg’s definition of
integration (Lindberg, 1963, 1965, 1966). Lindberg made a distinction between
the notion of political integration as a condition and as a process, and having
adopted the latter perspective, he stopped short of identifying an end-point in
the process. This is significant in relation to the proposed study of Social
Partnership, since it is important that the hypotheses do not specify the
outcome of the integrative process. Thus far we have considered some modified
forms of corporatism, but there is no reason to assume that these are the only
potential explanations for the evidence we find. 
Lindberg suggested that if the process of integration were taking place, it
would be manifest in four main ways: first, there would be some form of
institutional development of a kind that facilitated further policy integration;
second, there would be what Lindberg termed “elite activation”, referring to
the changing behaviour of key policymakers in favour of integration; third, the
government would provide continuing support for integrationist measures;
and fourth, functional and political spillover would lead to the creation of
“inherently expansive tasks”, whereby “a given action, related to a specific
goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by
taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for
more action, and so forth” (Lindberg, 1963, pp. 1-11). These propositions
provide a good basis from which to derive a set of integration hypotheses or
indicators that are able to relate the differences found between policy
networks to different levels of policy integration.2
VII APPLYING GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS TO THE IRISH CASE
The potential utility of governance concepts for Irish policy studies seems
apposite, since it appears that the manifestation of social partnership
comprises both vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy change. 
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Vertical Dimensions of Policy Change
In relation to the former, whilst European integration did not introduce
partnership government to Ireland, it did provide the back-drop and context
within which Ireland was able to develop this form of economic management.
After the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and the Treaty on European
Union in 1992, European Union membership provided Ireland with both a
limited range of policy choices and a clear set of policy objectives (Fitzgerald,
2000). Taken together, it is argued that “… the crisis during the 1980s, the
response of the elite to this and the role of the European Union as an agenda-
setting agency combined to provide the basis for the political and social
consensus that reinforced economic success during the 1990s” (Fitzgerald and
Girvin, 2000, p. 281). More specifically, a series of EU reforms to the structural
funds (CEC, 1989; 1990; 1993; 1998) both introduced and promoted
partnership as a key principle in the management and delivery of EU policies.
Given the significant and widespread impact of Structural Funding to the
Irish economy, it is perhaps not surprising that the opportunities they brought
to promote new methods of formulating and implementing EC programmes
and initiatives contributed to other horizontal dimensions of policy change
(Adshead and Quinn, 1998). In particular, the conditions attached to the
delivery of many EU sponsored programmes has led to a more broadly held
emphasis on the creation of partnership structures at sub-national level,
bringing together actors from statutory, voluntary, public and private sectors
in a manner which has gained international recognition (Sabel, 1996). 
Thus, in Ireland the move “from government to governance” has been
viewed as a relatively positive experience (Adshead and Quinn, 1998;
Adshead, 2002). Whilst there has been a limitation of the scope and form of
public intervention, and a loss of functions by both central and local
government departments to alternative delivery agencies; in many cases,
these changes have been seen positively as a move towards more participatory
democracy and subsidiarity in policymaking (Crowley, 1998). The increasing
interest taken by the European Union in public policy has not been viewed as
a threat to central government’s authority, but rather as an excellent
opportunity to develop pilot programmes and receive additional funding. New
legislation affecting the management and operation of the public sector in
relation to deployment of EU funding has been widely accepted as necessary
changes to a system long in need of reform (O’Donnell, 2000). The Irish
government’s willingness to share and/or devolve policy authority to new sets
of actors, and to foster new sets of relations between them – despite making
the policy arena a little more complex – has meant that the move from
government to governance is not perceived simply as a diminution of
government control, but rather as a positive redefinition of its role. This
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positive take on the advent of network governance, developed further by a
number of Dutch scholars (Kickert, 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; 2004)
and subsequently labelled “the Dutch School” reflects perhaps a different,
continental European approach to policymaking that is largely alien to British
politics and policymaking (Rhodes, 1996, 1997). 
Horizontal Dimensions of Policy Change
Using network typology, we might begin to classify and compare the
manifestation of different iterations of social partnership arrangements from
their first incarnation in 1987 to their most current and contemporary
evolution. This would of course necessitate a detailed empirical study, but we
can begin at least to sketch the content.3 The first Social Partnership
arrangement of 1987, for example, comprised a very limited membership. The
genesis of the arrangement began when the then Taoiseach, Charles Haughey,
called together representatives from business and trades unions in an attempt
to solve the economic crisis. Despite their differences, government, trades
union and business leaders were bound together by a shared consensus over
the need to tackle the economic crisis and in terms of resources they all had
something to contribute (tax restraint, wage restraint and working hours
respectively). More importantly, all could deliver their members into the
agreement because all participants could see some benefit from it. This
resulted in a positive sum power relationship that approximates more closely
to ideal type policy community. Subsequent arrangements for a second and
third agreement attest to the strength of this community.
The inclusion of a “Community and Voluntary Pillar” in the 1996
Partnership 2000 agreement represented a watershed for Social Partnership.
With a larger, more unwieldly membership comprising radically diversified
interests, the Community and Voluntary Pillar’s inclusion presented a
challenge to established arrangements (Meade, 2005). Certainly, the history of
the National Women’s Council and the Community Platform’s inclusion in the
process provides testimony to fluctuating access, frequency and intensity
between network members which serves to challenge the established
community’s basic values.4 As a result, whilst a measure of agreement exists,
tensions are ever present. A further challenge for Community and Voluntary
Pillar representation relates to their capacity to deliver their membership into
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agreements in the manner that older established network members can.
Moreover, since the resources of the Community and Voluntary Pillar are
extremely variable this often results in uneven capacity, reflecting unequal
resources: as a consequence outcomes for this pillar are more often than not
zero-sum arrangements. Interestingly, however, whilst the Community and
Voluntary Pillar itself more closely approximates an issue network in its
constitution, the relative institutionalisation of pre-existing policy community
does not seem seriously challenged. Instead we see a dichotomous parallel
development of Social Partnership interests, where the Community and
Voluntary Pillar is “grafted on” to the process, but denied access to policy
community (Murphy, 2002, p. 87).
One clear conclusion from this might be that so long as the Community
and Voluntary Pillar highlights the organisational difficulties associated with
issue networks, it equally reinforces the strong policy community features
associated with the other three pillars. It is perhaps this final insight from a
network analysis of Social Partnership that begins to contribute to a clearer
view about the nature of the state and by extension, whether or not Social
Partnership constitutes a new form of governance. On the one hand, if you
accept the current construction of Social Partnership arrangements at face
value, that is embodying four pillars of diverse interests – agriculture,
business, unions, the community and voluntary sector, plus the government –
then Social Partnership is self-evidently neither pure corporatism, neo-
corporatism, nor competitive corporatism. Current institutional set ups would
suggest quite simply that there is more to Social Partnership than can be
explained by any of these approaches. 
On the other hand, if you are more discriminating about the evidence you
select and point to the existence of long-term well-established policy
community, establishing a clear consensus between three major interests –
government, business, unions (and agriculture) – then you might be equally
swayed by neo corporatist or competitive corporatist definitions. In doing so,
you will however, be implicitly confirming that the status and condition of the
fourth pillar does not warrant attention. In this respect, the normative
assumptions underpinning the empirical focus of such studies are perhaps just
as revealing as the conclusions they draw. That is, the difference in the
interpretation depends on the selection of evidence and/or the empirical/
political perspective of those charged with its collection.
Synthesising Governance Approaches in Neofunctionalist Theory
To recap the arguments and issues raised already, we can ask three main
questions about the utility of network analysis (Adshead, 2003, p. 126). First,
what is its heuristic utility? Second, does its deployment add any new insights
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into the analysis? Third, does its deployment give us any greater insight into
the nature of the state?
In relation to the first point, it is clear that a network characterisation of
the range of actors and organisations involved in Social Partnership
arrangements does make for a relatively easy explanation which obviates the
need for detailed historical narrative. Moreover, the relative parsimony of this
approach does serve to highlight the significant structuring of the policy
arena, despite its impermanent and (superficially) ad hoc appearance. This
relates to the second issue about network utility. It could be argued that a
network approach to Social Partnership highlights the structural conditions
that need to be considered in relation to the organisation and implementation
of various Social Partnership arrangements. For example, it draws attention
(for both existing and would-be participants in the process) to the challenges
and constraints that the inclusion of the Community and Voluntary Pillar
raises for Social Partnership process. 
More generally, however, the explanatory utility of a network approach is
still subject to debate since there remains the problem of how to relate the
differences found between alternative networks to a common independent
variable, for if this cannot be done the comparative utility of network analysis
is lost. In relation to the Irish case, for example, there is little use in pointing
to the different manifestations of Social Partnership arrangements without
any attempt to explain why they might be so. It seems then that using policy
networks to describe Social Partnership may well tell us something about the
politics of the agreements, but still falls short of explaining the broader
process of changes in governance. It is this issue of finding and defining key
independent variables in order to explain network differentiation that left
network approaches most vulnerable to criticisms over their explanatory
utility. In order to remedy this, we need to choose an appropriate theory: one
which is constructed in such a way that the evidence collected cannot be
claimed by opposing theoretical viewpoints; and one that does not resort to
macro-level explanations of the state in its construction. If this were the case,
we would run the risk of differentiating networks according to different
interpretations of state and the heuristic utility of networks would be lost. The
following examples illustrate how neofunctionalist hypotheses might be
operationalised in relation to studies of Social Partnership.
Hypothesis one proposes that if integration is taking place, there will be
some form of institutional development that facilitates integration. This
hypothesis has two dimensions. At state level, a network analysis of national
Social Partnership agreements could point to the development of new national
institutions, such as the National Centre for Partnership and Performance
(NCPP) or the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF). Such a study
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would need to explore both their functional and political status: are they
acknowledged by network members as successful institutions? Do they have
the resources (technical, legal, administrative, financial) to carry out their
task? How inclusive are they? At sub-national level, policy network studies
could evaluate the extent of organisational engagement between policy actors
at sub-national level and national partnership institutions and question
whether the institutional configuration of current Social Partnership
arrangements facilitates effective engagement throughout the member
organisations? Additionally, one might ask how the institutions of national
level Social Partnership impact upon sub-national level? In doing so, evidence
of the continuing institutionalisation of Social Partnership at national and
sub-national levels may be taken as a positive sign of integration between
actors in the policy network. If this is not the case, we may see evidence of
moves towards new institutional frameworks that are more inclusive of
different policy interests. If so, then we may take it as a positive sign of moves
towards integration between alternative levels of government in the policy
process.
Hypothesis two concerning “elite activation” proposes that if integration is
taking place, it will be manifest in the changing attitudes and behaviour of key
network members in favour of further integration. These may be reflected in
their own positive opinions about Social Partnership, or in the strategic
development of either their own or their organisation’s interaction with the
actors and/or institutions of Social Partnership. If integration is occurring,
then an increase in both of these developments can be expected to lead to a
positive consensus regarding the future of Social Partnership. Certainly there
is already a range of evidence to suggest that this is the case with business and
TU members of Social Partnership arrangements (Thomas, 2003). Perhaps in
this regard, the more interesting question is whether more recent members of
the process share this positive view (Meade, 2005).
Hypothesis three proposes that if integration is taking place, it will be
manifest in government support for continuing integrationist measures. The
level of government “enthusiasm” for policy integration may be gauged by
examining not only whether the government enables Social Partnership or
not, but also the degree to which they attempt to facilitate and support it. If
government is non enthusiastic, it may give only minimal support in order to
avoid the charge of obstruction or presiding over policy failure. If government
is enthusiastic, however, it may wish to develop the organisation of policy in
such a way that it actively supports further integration. On the one hand, the
Irish government’s support for Social Partnership is evidenced by their desire
to promote it as a policy instrument for the resolution of issues other than
work and pay, including new issues as diverse as migrants, work/life balance,
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affordable housing and the hidden economy (Meade, 2005, p. 356). On the
other hand, the government could be accused of giving only minimal support
to this diversification of Social Partnership through their rather cynical
funding of some Community and Voluntary representatives over others (CWC,
2003; Regan, 2004, 2005). From this perspective, an examination of
alternative government and/or party approaches to Social Partnership would
provide a worthwhile investigation by: first, demonstrating the pivotal
position of the government in Social Partnership arrangements (thereby
refuting the interpretation of governance as self-organising networks); and
second, challenging the notion of an Irish governmental consensus about
Social Partnership (when quite clearly different governments have shown
different attitudes to different Social Partnership arrangements).
Hypothesis four proposes that if integration is taking place, it should – as
a consequence of both functional and political spillover – lead to the creation of
“inherently expansive tasks” which will both cement the level of integration
achieved and push for further integration where possible.
In many ways, this hypothesis represents a composite of the previous
three. For example, the logic of functional spillover suggests that if an initial
form of institutional development that facilitates Social Partnership proves
successful, it should create greater pressure for similar developments in other
aspects of the policy process (the establishment of NESF in 1993, perhaps?).
Alternatively, according to the logic of political spillover, if there is a
convergence of elite attitudes in favour of integration and government support
for it, this should lead to an increase in political activities that support Social
Partnership. Once more, we might expect this hypothesis to uncover the
variable levels of policy integration between different participants in Social
Partnership, reflecting the varying perceptions of its functional utility as an
effective policy instrument. Naturally, however, it would take a more detailed
empirical study before we might begin to speculate on the conclusions we could
draw from this analysis – about either the institutional and procedural
arrangements of Social Partnership, or the theorising of the Irish state.
VIII CONCLUSIONS
The proposed methodology for the analysis of Social Partnership is a
relatively simple one. It uses a functionalist definition of integration to outline
the process by which policy integration can be identified. It presents policy
network analysis as a neutral model with which we can compare policymaking
processes between different Social Partnership agreements and/or between
different policy fields under the same agreement. It hypothesises Lindberg’s
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four integration propositions as evidence of positive integration in policy
networks and assumes that the higher the incidence of positive integration
indicators, the higher the level of integration between policy actors and
institutions in the network.
Applying neofunctionalist propositions about integration as indicators of
change in policy networks allows us to outline the different kinds of relations
that are possible between policy actors in different policy networks without
resorting to macro-level theories of the state. This is important because it
enables us to disentangle the idea of Social Partnership (if only temporarily)
from alternative conceptualisations of the state. In other words, it enables us
to identify different aspects of network structure and network actors”
behaviour that give rise to different network configurations and to relate these
differences to the incidence of policy integration achieved – rather than
ascribing this difference to a particular state form (such as corporatist, neo-
corporatist, competitive corporatist, or post-corporatist), since to do so would
be to suggest that each Social Partnership arrangement was so unique that it
could not be compared to another. 
The advantage of this framework is that it allows us to study Social
Partnership as it is manifested in different levels of analysis (sub-national,
sectoral and so on) in Ireland; and also enables us to place the case of Social
Partnership into a broader cross-national comparative context. In relation to
the former, we can assemble evidence regarding the “depth” of the process
within participating organisations at regional and local levels as well as the
“breadth” of Social Partnership in terms of whether or not it represents
uniformly held values and attitudes to policy making (which one might expect
of a new mode of governance). In relation to the latter, we can compare Irish
Social Partnership with social pacts in other states arising as a consequence
of different mixes of institutional, political and policy-related variables in the
policy networks of alternative policy arenas. In other words, we can look at the
incidence of Social Partnership in Ireland as but one policy response in one
state to the changing external environment described by multi-level
governance propositions across all European states. This raises the possibility
of interpreting Social Partnership in ways that have not yet been considered
at all.
The above discussion has laid the foundations for the argument that
corporatist, neo-corporatist and competitive corporatist approaches do not
adequately describe the changes in governance associated with Social
Partnership since they fail to take account of the full range of actors and
organisations involved in current manifestations of Social Partnership. For
the moment, this appears to leave only O’Donnell and O’Reardon’s (2000) post
corporatist concertation approach in the frame. A third option might be a
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further re-definition of corporatism (Schmitter, 1982). Neo neo-corporatism?
Post neo-corporatism? Though of course, it could be argued that this is what
O’Donnell and O’Reardon (2000) have already done by proposing post
corporatist concertation. In any event, none of these explanations are
particularly useful if they only present new ways of describing the Irish case
that have no explanatory purchase over other cases. In other words, if post
corporatist concertation only described and explained Irish social partnership,
what would be the point in its creation. We might as well just continue
describing “Irish Social Partnership” without the burden of a new term.
Presumably, then our task is to find ways of collecting evidence about Social
Partnership that can be just as easily deployed in the Irish case as any other
and in so doing create evidence about whether the Irish manifestation of
Social Partnership is a new and unique mode of governance or something
quite similar to new forms of governance elsewhere.  
To conclude, current debates about “… what state form most clearly
depicts the Irish state since the advent of Social Partnership” put the cart
before the horse. Instead of characterising the state and using the advent of
Social Partnership to support this characterisation; we should first
characterise Social Partnership. By developing a means of characterising
Social Partnership independent of state form, we can begin to collect the
evidence necessary for further theorising of the state. The framework for
analysis outlined in this paper represents a first step in that direction.
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